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Fostering Family Ties: The State As Maker
And Breaker of Kinship Relationships
Ellen Marrust
Gloria never had the opportunity to live with her biological
parents. Following her birth, she was placed in Ms. L's foster
home by the Massachusetts Department of Social Services
("D.S.S."). 1 Her parents, who were drug abusers, failed to comply
with the state's plan for reunification of the family, and, there-
fore, their parental rights over Gloria were terminated. 2 Ms. L
adopted Gloria at the age of four. 3 When Gloria was two years
old, her biological parents had another child, Hugo, who was also
removed from the parents' care immediately after birth.4 Hugo
was also placed in foster care, but not with Ms. L, who at that
time had no room for him in her house.5 Shortly after Hugo's sec-
ond birthday, however, his foster mother refused to continue car-
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1 Adoption of Hugo, 700 NE2d 516, 518 (Mass 1998), revg 694 NE2d 377 (Mass App
1998). The Hugo case did not involve Gloria's placement or future adoption by Ms. L.
Rather, the opinions examine the adoption of Hugo and whether he could maintain a
relationship with his biological sister, Gloria. We know very little about Gloria. There was
no indication that her adoption by Ms. L was appealed or that any relative came forward
to try and adopt her before Ms. L. did. One of the petitions regarding certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court on the adoption of Hugo does mention an older brother who
was also placed out of the home, but there is no indication as to why Gloria and Hugo
were not placed with this other sibling. Brief for Respondent n 4, Opposition for Writ of
Certiorari.
2 Hugo, 694 NE2d at 377-78 (noting that parental unfitness is conceded on appeal).
3 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 518.
4 Id.
5 Hugo, 694 NE2d at 378.
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ing for him, and D.S.S. planned to place him in Gloria's adoptive
home.6 At that point, a paternal aunt came forward and ex-
pressed an interest in obtaining custody of Hugo. D.S.S. denied
her request.7 None of the court opinions ever alluded to the rea-
son for this denial. After Hugo was placed with Ms. L, his bio-
logical parents were again deemed "unfit," and the state termi-
nated their parental rights as to Hugo.8 Ms. L, whom Hugo called
"Mommy," wanted to adopt him, and D.S.S. found her to be a
suitable adoptive parent. 9 The paternal aunt objected and indi-
cated her desire to adopt Hugo; the biological parents supported
the aunt's plan. 10
Evidence at Hugo's adoption hearing indicated that he had
bonded with Ms. L and Gloria, and was thriving despite emo-
tional and developmental problems." Experts testified that Hugo
was "a fragile child for whom transitions were difficult."' 2 The
trial judge determined that the aunt would provide the best
placement for Hugo, and ordered him to live with her in New
Jersey.' 3 An intermediate appellate court reversed the judge's
decision,' 4 but the state supreme court reinstated the trial court's
ruling.15 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 16
The state makes and breaks families in different ways, and
the facts of this case reflect only one possible scenario. In Adop-
tion of Hugo," Gloria and her brother did not know each other
initially because Hugo was born when his sister was two years
old, and because the state, in the form of the Massachusetts
D.S.S., originally could not place them together. 8 When D.S.S.
belatedly united them, it enabled an emotional attachment be-
tween the siblings to form.' 9 Yet the state, in the form of a Mas-
sachusetts trial judge, then permitted an aunt, who had appar-
6 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 518 and n 2.
7 Id at 518.
8 Id at 518 n 4.
9 Id at 518-19.
10 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 519.
11 Id.
12 Id at 523.
13 Hugo, 694 NE2d at 378.
14 Id at 377.
15 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 526.
16 Hugo, 526 US 1034.
' 700 NE2d 516.
18 Hugo, 694 NE2d at 378.
19 Id.
320 [2004:
319] FOSTERING FAMILY TIES
ently never seen Hugo, to take him away from his sister and sur-
rogate mother.
The state often ignores important family and sibling bonds
when making placement and visitation decisions for abused and
neglected children. For example, siblings may be removed from
their parents' care at the same time, and yet be placed in differ-
ent foster or group homes, depending on their ages and needs. 20
During the course of the dependency action, the state might re-
turn the siblings to the parental home as an intact group or re-
turn only some children to the parents, turning others over to
relatives or foster or group homes. 21 If parental abuse reoccurs at
a later date, the state may again remove and separate the re-
turned children.
Similarly, the state initially may place siblings together in a
foster home while the parents work towards reunification. 22 If
the parents cannot comply with the state's plan for reunification,
20 See William W. Patton, Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings'Asso-
ciation Rights, 48 U Miami L Rev 745, 746-47 (1994) (stressing that in dependency pro-
ceedings many siblings are separated during one of the most traumatic periods of their
lives). In another variation, members of a sibling group may have different fathers. The
state may remove the children from their mother's care due to abuse, and place them in a
foster home together. One or more of the fathers, or their relatives, may be in a position
to take custody, temporarily or permanently, of the biologically related children. The
court, however, may keep the half-brothers and sisters in foster care, or return them to
the mother, or place them for adoption with someone else. Again, this state action sepa-
rates brothers and sisters. See, for example, In re Celine R, 71 P3d 787, 790 (Cal. 2003).
In Celine R, the children shared the same mother but not the same father. Id. The older
half-sister initially was placed with her maternal aunt, and the younger siblings were
placed with their paternal uncle. Id. The paternal uncle wanted to adopt the younger
siblings, but not the older half-sister, who was placed in permanent foster care because
the maternal aunt was unwilling to adopt. Id. See also In the Interest of SV, 395 NW2d
666 (Iowa App 1986). In this case, four siblings were removed from their parents' home.
Id at 667-68. The father and mother divorced and all four children were placed in foster
care. Id. Two of the children were later returned to the mother. Id. The court placed a
third child with her natural father, and the court granted SV's father a trial home place-
ment. SV, 395 NW2d at 668, 672.
21 See Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 748 (cited in note 20) (discussing In re Jennifer C,
Solano County Sup Ct No J22026, Cal Ct App No A058278). In Jennifer C, four siblings
were initially placed with their paternal grandmother. Id. After subsequent hearings,
however, one sibling remained with the grandmother, while the other three siblings were
placed in a non-relative foster home. Id at 749. See also, William W. Patton, The Status of
Siblings' Rights: A View Into the New Millennium, 51 DePaul L Rev 1, 1 (2001) (noting
that based on his 1994 study, about 40 percent of siblings taken from the home were
separated into different placements).
22 See Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 758 (cited in note 20) (noting that the initial
placement of siblings during dependency or reunification procedures is the most impor-
tant factor in determining whether siblings will be placed together once the court termi-
nates parental rights).
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the state terminates their rights.23 To facilitate adoption the
children may be divided and sent to several potential adoptive
homes. 24 It is also possible that the ages of two or more sibling
groups differ significantly, so that the older siblings could poten-
tially provide a home for the younger siblings.
Frequently, one child, "the scapegoat," may be removed from
his or her parents' care because of abuse, while the other chil-
dren remain in the family home.25 The parents may not want to
facilitate contact between the siblings and may refuse to let the
child placed out of the home visit with his sisters and brothers.26
23 See William W. Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24
Ga L Rev 473, 477 n 16 (1990) (providing examples of state statutes which allow a short
period of time in which parents may demonstrate that family problems have been re-
solved, or else mandate parental severance and adoption).
24 See Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 753 (arguing that both federal and state statutes
governing child placement may needlessly and prematurely separate siblings under the
belief that it may be difficult and time-consuming to place an entire sibling group in an
adoptive home).
Consider another hypothetical. Jamie, age eight, Troy, age six, and Bill, age four,
are removed from their parents' care because of abuse. Jamie and Troy are placed in one
foster home and Bill, because of his special needs, is placed in a different foster home. The
siblings visit each other and attend family counseling with their biological parents. The
parents do not make enough progress on the state-mandated reunification plan and the
state terminates their parental rights as to all of the children. Jamie and Troy want to
live in the same home as Bill. Bill's foster parents are willing to adopt him, but not the
other two children. Jamie and Troy have no adoptive prospects. Their therapist testifies
that it would cause emotional harm for Jamie and Troy to lose their parents and contact
with Bill at the same time. The court finds that it will serve Bill's best interests to be
adopted by his foster parents, and declines to order continued contact between the sib-
lings. Bill's adoptive parents do not let him visit with his brothers. A similar case is In re
Jason R, 2003 WL 22464053 (Cal App), where the two older siblings had been under the
department's jurisdiction, but at the time of the case they lived with the mother. Id at *1.
The youngest child's foster mother wanted to adopt him, but would not continue visitation
with the other siblings. Id. The court stated that the child had only lived with the siblings
during the first two months of his life and that severing those ties would not be detrimen-
tal. Id at *12. See also Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 753-54 (cited in note 20) (noting that
many statutes make it difficult to place a sibling group, focusing on adoption as the best
placement, and using each child's best interests as the determining factor, rather than
the best interests of the sibling group, especially when one sibling can be adopted).
25 See, for example, In Re Tamara R, 764 A2d 844 (Md 2000). Tamara was found to
be a child in need of assistance ("CINA"), but her younger siblings remained with her
father and stepmother. Id at 844.
26 See id. The sexual abuse allegations Tamara made against her father were never
resolved. Id at 846. The court, however, found her to be CINA because of the parent-child
conflict. Tamara R, 764 A2d at 846. Tamara requested visitation with her siblings but the
father denied this request. Id. The court remanded the case for the trial judge to balance
the children's interest in maintaining the sibling relationship against the father's consti-
tutional right to raise the children is his custody as he saw fit. Id at 857. See also Ken R
on Behalf of CR v Arthur Z, 682 A2d 1267 (Pa 1996). In Ken R, the petitioner sought
visitation with her two younger sisters who remained with her natural mother and step-
father. Id at 1269. She had previously lived with her mother but had accused her stepfa-
FOSTERING FAMILY TIES
The thread connecting these and other placement and visita-
tion variations is the state's ability and willingness to create,
destroy, or recreate family ties in ways that are frequently det-
rimental to children. I have previously written about the legal
rights of and psychological impact on children separated from
their siblings by their parents,27 and also about parents who
deny visitation between grandparents and grandchildren. 28 I ar-
gued that in such contexts children should have standing to sue
to obtain visitation rights,29 or at least to have their voices heard
when the court determines visitation.30 There is, however, a dif-
ference between cases in which parents, whose interests have
strong constitutional protection, prevent visitation with their
children, and cases in which the state uses its parens patriae
power to remove siblings from their parents' care and custody
and then separates them. 31 In the latter situation, the conse-
quences may be far more serious. The psychological effect
heightens because the child loses the connection, not only to the
sibling group, but also to his or her parents and other members
of the extended family.32 In such situations the child is the "res"
of dependency proceedings brought by the state, and is usually
represented by counsel. 33 In that context, it is not so much a
question of whether children should be granted standing, or
whether the court has jurisdiction over them, but rather what
substantive rights they have or should have to protect sibling or
other family relationships.
Concern for the child's best interests serves as the overriding
principle in dependency cases, and to that end a majority of
states regard kinship relations as a priority when determining
ther of sexual abuse. Id at 1268. The stepfather denied the allegations, but all parties
entered into a Protection from Abuse order and agreed that she would stay with her
natural father. Id at 1268-69. The court decided that she did not have standing to seek
visitation with her siblings. Ken R, 682 A2d at 1271.
27 Ellen Marrus, Where Have You Been, Fran? The Right of Siblings to Seek Court
Access to Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 Tenn L Rev 977 (1999).
28 Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparents' House We
Go: Or Do We, Post-Troxel?, 43 Ariz L Rev 751 (2001).
29 Marrus, 66 Tenn L Rev at 1018 (cited in note 27).
30 Marrus, 43 Ariz L Rev at 756, 812 (cited in note 28).
31 The state also has police power to punish the parents if the abuse constitutes
criminal conduct.
32 See Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 746-47 (cited in note 20) (noting the traumatic
consequences to siblings separated from each other and their parents during court pro-
ceedings).
33 See Cal Welf & Inst Code § 317(c) (West 2003) (stating that if a child is unrepre-
sented during a dependency hearing the court shall appoint counsel).
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placements either for foster care or adoption.34 The manner of
application, however, is not always in the child's best interests.
Thus, the Hugo case is not aberrational, and similar cases pre-
sent complex psychological and legal issues.
In this Article, I analyze how states utilize their power in
detrimental ways in determining how and with whom children
should reside when parents fail. First, I examine the various
stages of a dependency proceeding. In that context, I discuss
state statutes and federal legislation that list preferences for a
child's placement and how those options support or conflict with
the continuation of the sibling and family relationship and the
child's best interests. Second, I address the Hugo case specifically
and suggest that a different result may have been more benefi-
cial to Hugo, Gloria, the aunt, and Ms. L. One of the difficulties
in Hugo is Hugo's conflicting kinship connections with the un-
known aunt and his beloved sister. Thus, fulfilling the statutory
hierarchy of priorities often becomes more challenging, but gives
more leeway to the state in deciding where to place children and
with whom they can maintain contact. Third, I analyze the
United States Supreme Court cases that discuss family relation-
ships and the guidance they offer for the existence of a funda-
mental right in sibling relationships. Finally, I suggest how to
further the best interests of all the children in a sibling group in
dependency proceedings, and how to make the benefits of a con-
tinued sibling and family relationship more likely to occur.
34 See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 8-514.03(a) (West 2003) (promoting child
placement in kinship foster care); Cal Welf & Inst Code §§ 309(a), 16605(a) (West 2003)
(encouraging kinship placement during reunification services and mandating an appro-
priation of funds to assist relative caregivers in the Kinship Support Services Program);
Md Fam Law Code Ann § 5-534(c) (West 2003) (mandating that in determining the best
interests of a child, first priority is given to placing the child with a kinship relation);
Okla Stat Ann § 7004-1.5 (West 2003) (establishing the Kinship Foster Care Program and
stating that the social service agency should attempt to place the child who has been
removed from his-or her home with a kinship relative). See Patton, 51 DePaul L Rev at 23
(cited in note 21) (noting state statutes mandating that courts consider sibling contact
throughout the dependency proceeding). Patton also discusses the shift in courts' atti-
tudes to prefer a kinship placement over a non-family placement. Id.
See also Matter of H R, 594 NYS2d 968, 970 (NY Fam Ct 1993) (deriving from both
regulatory and statutory law the strong policy of keeping siblings together); In re Dante
H, 2003 WL 22664646 (Cal App) (noting a statutory exception to the presumption that
adoption is in the best interests of the child when there would be a "substantial interfer-
ence" with a sibling relationship, Cal Welf& Inst Code § 366.26(c)(1)(E) (West 2003)).
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I. How PRE-TERMINATION PLACEMENTS AFFECT POST-
TERMINATION DECISIONS: PROCEDURES AND LEGISLATION
The child welfare system regulates abused and neglected
children and their families and has three primary goals: the pro-
tection of the child, the strengthening of the family unit, and the
establishment of permanency for the child.35 Families in the sys-
tem present a myriad of factual variations. Examining a "typical"
dependency proceeding at its different stages clarifies the vari-
ous opportunities that the state has to make or break sibling re-
lationships.
A. Initiation of a Dependency Case
Allegations of abuse36 and neglect 37 against a parent or care-
giver initiate a dependency case. These allegations can come
from a parent, family member, school official, neighbor, doctor,
teacher, or any other person who may have knowledge of the
situation. 38 All states have mandatory reporting statutes requir-
35 See 42 USC § 5106a (2000) (instituting grant funding for state child abuse and
neglect prevention programs, adopting the goals of protecting the legal rights and safety
of children and families at all stages, and protecting children from abuse and neglect); 42
USC § 5111 (2000) (adopting the goal of permanent placement of foster children by re-
moving barriers to adoption). See also NJ Stat § 9:6-8.7 (2003) (declaring that the safety
of the children"shall be of paramount concern," and "that reasonable efforts be made to
preserve the family," and requiring that if the child is not returned home, the agency will
attempt to find a permanent placement for the child in a timely manner).
36 See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 39.01 (West 2003) (defining abuse as any willful
or threatened act resulting in "any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes
the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired"); Tex Fam
Code Ann § 261.001(1)(A)-(K) (West 2003) (listing acts and omissions that constitute child
abuse, including mental, emotional, or physical injury that results in substantial harm to
the child; sexual conduct that is harmful to the child's mental, emotional, or physical
welfare; or failing to make reasonable efforts to prevent an act that results in physical
injury causing substantial harm to the child).
37 Fla Stat Ann § 39.01 (defining neglect as depriving or allowing a child to be de-
prived of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment; or allowing a child to live
in an environment that causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be
significantly impaired); Tex Fam Code Ann § 261.001(4)(A)-(C) (listing acts or omissions
constituting neglect, including leaving a child in a situation where he or she would be
exposed to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm; failing to seek appropriate
medical care; or failing to provide basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter).
38 See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 39.201 (West 2003) (ordering "any person" who
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is being abused, abandoned, or
neglected to report such knowledge to the Department of Education); Md Fam Law Code
Ann § 5-705 (Michie 2003) (listing reporting procedures for persons having reason to
believe that a child is being abused or neglected); Tex Fam Code Ann § 261.101(a) (West
2003) (ordering any person who has cause to believe a child is being abused or neglected
to immediately make a report pursuant to the statute's mandates).
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ing either certain classes of people or any person to notify child
welfare authorities if they suspect child abuse.39
The state agency for child protection investigates these alle-
gations, and, if it believes they are substantiated, the agency
may file a petition alleging abuse and neglect and requesting the
court to grant particularized relief.40 The requests vary depend-
ing on the facts of the case. The child welfare agency may ask the
court to order the parents to participate in a variety of activities
including attending parenting classes, substance abuse clinics,
and counseling, as a way of keeping the family intact. Or they
may request permission to remove the children from the parents'
care and provide additional resources to reunify the family. If the
children have already been removed on an emergency basis the
agency seeks judicial approval of its action and asks the court to
order the parents to avail themselves of various services with a
view to reuniting the family. When the abuse is very severe, the
agency may seek immediate termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship. If the agency requests and receives an order removing
the children from the home, even at this early stage, the chil-
dren's placement is crucial to the continuation of family and sib-
ling ties. Thus, what the state does at this point in terms of
placement may affect the child's psychological and physical well-
being. All of these issues are the focus of the hearing on tempo-
rary placement.
39 Typically doctors, teachers, and mental health professionals have the duty to re-
port. See, for example, Cal Penal Code § 11165.7 (West 2003) (listing mandated reporters,
including teachers, instructional aides, social workers, probation officers, parole officers,
firefighters, and certain unlicensed therapists and psychological assistants). In other
states, anyone who sees the abuse must notify the proper authorities. See note 39. Will-
fully failing to report abuse or neglect is usually punishable as a misdemeanor. See, for
example, Tex Fam Code Ann § 261.109(b) (West 2003) (classifying a knowing failure to
report child abuse or neglect as a Class B misdemeanor). Although it is unusual for
charges to be brought against a non-reporter, informants have good faith immunity if the
abuse charges are not sustained. See, for example, Md Cts & Jud Proc Code Ann § 5-620
(2003); Tex Fain Code Ann § 261.106 (West 2003).
40 For example, in California a social worker is to conduct an immediate investigation
into the facts and circumstances of a child being taken into custody under the abuse and
neglect statutes. See Cal Welf & Inst Code § 309(a) (West 2003). Upon the filing of the
petition by the social worker, a proceeding to declare the child to be a dependent child of
the court will immediately commence. Cal Welf & Inst Code § 325 (West 2003). California
law also outlines what must be contained in this petition, including identifying informa-
tion of the parties and the facts to support the child coming under the court's jurisdiction
because of abuse or neglect. Cal Welf & Inst Code § 332 (West 2003).
326 [2004:
319] FOSTERING FAMILY TIES
B. Hearing on Temporary Placement
Prior to an adjudicatory hearing to determine the accuracy
of the charges, the court holds a hearing to determine if a tempo-
rary placement out of the home is necessary for the safety of the
child.41 At this hearing, the state agency must establish a rea-
sonable basis for believing that the child needs to be temporarily
removed from the home pending the adjudicatory hearing.42 The
standards for removal include a reasonable belief that by re-
maining in the home the child will suffer further harm, that the
parents will abscond with the child, or that a parent is unwilling
to care for the child.43 Therefore, at this stage, the nebulous "best
interests of the child" standard is generally not invoked; rather,
the state simply seeks to prevent further injury or death.44 Par-
ents have no federal constitutional right to counsel at this hear-
ing,45 and many states do not automatically provide attorneys for
indigent parents in these preliminary proceedings. 46 This first
placement decision at the initial hearing is usually made very
quickly, within hours of the child's emergency removal,47 without
41 See, for example, NY Fain Ct Act § 1027 (stating that the family court "shall hold a
hearing as soon as practicable to determine whether the child's interests require protec-
tion" prior to a final placement decision).
42 See NJ Stat Ann § 9:6-8.28 (West 2003) (stating that the court can enter an order
to remove a child from a parent's care if it is necessary to avoid harm to the child); NY
Fain Ct Act § 1022 (McKinney 2003) (permitting a child to be removed from a parent's
care with a court order if "necessary to avoid imminent danger to the child's life or
health"); NY Fam Ct Act § 1024 (McKinney 2003) (allowing for removal without court
order if a designated individual has "reasonable cause to believe" that if there is an "im-
minent danger to the child's life or health; and there is not time enough to apply for an
order").
43 See, for example, Cal Welf& Inst Code § 309(a)(1)(2)(3).
44 See NJ Stat §§ 9:6-8.28, 8.31, and 8.32 (West 2003) (mandating that the child is to
remain out of the home unless it is safe to return the child to the parents' care). But see
NY Fam Ct Act § 1022 (stating that the court is to determine if "continuation in the
child's home would be contrary to the best interests of the child and... whether reason-
able efforts were made ... to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from
the home").
45 See Lassiter v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18 (1981) (holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the appointment of
counsel for indigent parents in every parental termination case).
46 See Garramone v Romo, 94 F3d 1446, 1449-50 (10th Cir 1996) (adopting the
Lassiter approach but finding that under the circumstances in the case, the mother had a
right to counsel at a preliminary stage of a neglect proceeding); Davis v Page, 714 F2d
512, 514 (5th Cir 1982) (holding that the right to counsel in Florida dependency cases is
not guaranteed in every case, but is to be determined on a case-by-case basis).
47 See, for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code § 309 (mandating that a social worker is to
investigate immediately any reported allegations of child abuse and must either take the
child into custody or return the child home).
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deep investigation of the family or resources, and without psy-
chiatric evaluations. 48 The issue at this stage is not where the
child will be placed, but rather if the child is to be removed from
parental care pending the adjudicatory hearing.
In reconciling the somewhat conflicting goals of the child
welfare system, states try not to remove children from their
homes, but rather to leave them in the parents' care under the
supervision of the state.49 During this time the state agency pro-
vides services that it believes are essential to provide for the
safety of the children and to make the "reasonable efforts" re-
quired to keep the family intact.50 On the other hand, if the state
agency meets its burden of proving removal is necessary, it
places the children in temporary protective custody for the child's
safety and well-being.51 The state attempts to make the tempo-
rary placement of the children, both before and after adjudica-
tion, as minimally restrictive and as much like home as possi-
ble.52
48 Since an abused child needs to be placed immediately, it is almost impossible for
the social worker to complete a thorough investigation of resources that may be available
for the child and family. Social workers are usually authorized to investigate the home
situation of any family member who has indicated a willingness to care for the child, see,
for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code § 309(d)(1), but if this information is not given to child
protective services workers, it is unlikely that they will know of family members to con-
tact. Furthermore, since the initial investigation is cursory, if the child is left at home, he
or she can be removed later if the social worker receives additional information that is
determined to be detrimental to the well-being of the child. See Cal Welf & Inst Code §
309.
49 See, for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code §§ 306(b)-(b)(1) (West 2003) (stating that a
social worker must first consider whether a child can remain with his family before tak-
ing the child into custody, and directing the social worker to determine if there are any
reasonable state actions that would eliminate the need to remove the child from his par-
ents' custody); NJ Stat Ann § 9:6-4 (West 2003) (providing that a child shall be placed
outside of his home "only after the department has made every reasonable effort, includ-
ing the provision or arrangement of financial or other assistance and services as neces-
sary").
50 NJ Stat Ann § 9:6-4.
51 See, for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code §§ 305-07 (West 2003) (mandating that
peace officers and social workers may, without a warrant, take a child into temporary
protective custody where there is a reasonable suspicion of abuse, and when such custody
is necessary to preserve the child's health and safety).
52 See, for example, NJ Stat Ann § 9:6B-4 (listing the rights of children placed out of
the home, including the right to placement in the least restrictive setting appropriate to
the needs of the child, and the right to sibling visitation or contact); W Va R Child Abuse
& Neglect P Rule 28 (2003) (mandating a priority for home or kinship placement; if these
placements are not available, the Department's report has to include a description of the
outside placement including the distance from the home and must indicate whether it is
the "most family-like" placement available).
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Removal from the home can last weeks,5 3 which may seem
like forever to a child. The state has several options, even at this
early stage. The state may place the child with relatives, in fos-
ter care, in emergency shelter, in group homes, in residential
treatment centers, in hospitals, or in mental health institu-
tions.54 Moreover, if the child exhibits status offense behavior 55
or commits a delinquent act 56 in any of these placements, the
state, with judicial approval, can transfer the child to a locked
facility.57
The choice of placement can deeply affect the child. Chil-
dren, particularly young ones, often do not wish to leave their
homes no matter how badly they have been abused.58 In their
eyes, it is better to live with the known devil, rather than the
unknown; as strange as it may seem, a bond exists between the
abusing parent and the abused child.59 Therefore, removal from
the home is a traumatic event for the child-akin to the abuse
53 See Tex Fam Code § 262.201 (West 2003) (noting that if the child is not returned to
the parent or guardian's care, the court must hold a full hearing within fourteen days).
Although the adjudicatory hearing must be held within a statutorily fixed time period
after the removal of a child from the home, if the petition is sustained there is no guaran-
tee that the child will be able to go home after the adjudicatory hearing.
54 See, for example, Cal Welf& Inst Code §§ 319.1-19.2 (West 2003).
55 See, for example, Ga Code Ann § 15-11-2 (West 2003) (defining a status offender as
a child who is accused or adjudicated of a crime that would not be an offense if committed
by an adult); Tex Fam Code Ann § 51.02 (West 2003) (defining a status offender as a
"child who is accused, adjudicated, or convicted for conduct that would not... be a crime
if committed by an adult").
56 See, for example, Ga Code Ann § 15-11-2 (defining a delinquent child as a child
who commits a crime by the laws of the state or another state, if the act occurred in that
state); Tex Fam Code Ann § 51.03 (West 2003) (defining delinquent conduct as "conduct,
other than a traffic offense, that violates a penal law of this state or the United States
punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail;" conduct that violates a court
order; or conduct that violates the listed provision of the Alcoholic Beverages Code).
51 See, for example, Tex Fam Code Ann § 51.02(14)-(15) (West 2003) (providing that
adjudicated juvenile offenders may be placed in correctional facilities and accused offend-
ers may be temporarily placed in detention facilities).
58 See Lisa Bloom, Gretel Fights Back: Representing Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs
Who Were Sexually Abused as Children, 12 Berkeley Women's L J 1 (1997). Bloom cites
research that shows abused children generally will make "superhuman" efforts to remain
with an abusive parent and stay in familiar surroundings, and compares this psychosocial
aspect of abuse to the classic Hansel and Gretel fable. Id at 1-2. In the fable, Hansel and
Gretel did everything in their power to return home to their parents, who had twice tried
to murder them. Id.
59 See David A. Wolfe, Child Abuse: Implications for Child Development and Psycho-
pathology 33 (Sage 2d ed 1999) (discussing the psychological impacts of child abuse and
stating that the abused child has strong ties to the family and abuser). See also Cynthia
Crosson-Tower, When Children are Abused: An Educator's Guide to Intervention 123
(Allyn & Bacon 2002) (noting that children feel a greater sense of security in their own
homes no matter how dysfunctional or abusive they may be).
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suffered at the hands of his or her parent.60 If a child is also
separated from his or her siblings, the event causes even greater
pain and suffering and psychological isolation.61
State resources are generally insufficient to provide proper
care for abused and neglected children. 62 As a result, the state
may place abused or neglected siblings in different homes or in-
stitutions.63 The environments in these facilities may also be
dangerous. 64 Abused children are often difficult to handle and
may act out;65 this conduct may cause them to be shuffled several
times between foster homes and institutions. 66 Moreover, if the
60 See Rachel Venier, Parental Rights and the Best Interest of the Child: Implications
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on Domestic Violence Victims' Rights, 8 Am
U J Gender Soc Pol & L 517, 535-36 (2000) (arguing that the removal of abused and ne-
glected children often re-victimizes them when one parent is a non-abuser). Venier cites
various sources that discuss removal-even from an inadequate or abusive home-as a
form of child abuse. Id at 535 n 93.
61 See In re Tamara R., 764 A2d 844, 855 (Md App 2000), citing Obey v Degling, 337
NE2d 601 (1975) (stressing that the separation of young brothers and sisters is traumatic
and harmful); Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 746 (cited in note 20) (describing the trau-
matic emotional upheaval of dependent children who are taken from an abusive home,
and then lose their last psychological bond with their siblings "during the height of their
greatest emotional plight").
62 See Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for
Children When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 Wm & Mary J Women & L 413, 417
(2003) (noting that by providing funding for foster care rather than preventive services,
the state is using foster care as the primary method of treating child abuse and causing
more children to remain in foster care "limbo" separated from any family connections).
See also General Accounting Office, Child Welfare: HHS Could Play a Greater Role in
Helping Child Welfare Agencies, GAO-03-357 (Mar 31, 2003), available online at
<http'//www.gao.gov> (visited May 3, 2004) (reporting that the lack of training and re-
sources as well as the high caseloads for state social services workers makes it difficult
for state agencies to ensure safe, appropriate, and permanent placements for abused and
neglected children); Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone The Pernicious Effect of Emer-
gency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 41 Fam CR 457, 459 (2003) (stating that
incidents of abuse, including fatalities, occur more often in foster care than in family
homes).
63 See Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 756 (cited in note 20) (noting that 1990 data
indicates that in California, New York, and Illinois, approximately 40 percent of all sib-
lings placed outside of the family home due to abuse receive different placements).
64 See David J. Herring, Child Placement Decisions: The Relevance of Facial Resem-
blance and Biological Relationships, 43 Jurimetrics J 387, 401 (2003) (discussing studies
that reveal higher incidences of abuse and neglect for foster children as compared to
children in the general population).
65 See D. Lee Khachaturian, Domestic Violence and Shared Parental Responsibility:
Dangerous Bedfellows, 44 Wayne L Rev 1745, 1758 & n 70-72. (noting the various psycho-
logical and behavioral problems that abused children may exhibit).
66 See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 Harv CR-CL L Rev 199, 208 & n 38 (1988)
(noting that foster placements are often extremely unstable, and that four or more foster
placements for a single abused child is not uncommon); Katherine A. Hort, Note, Is
Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child?, 28 Fordham Urban L J 1879,
1880 & n 21 (2001) (noting the use of the term "foster care drift" to describe children left
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state believes the family can be reunited, the agency may shift
children from one foster family to another, in order to prevent
attachment between the children and the foster parents. 67
Although parents are usually permitted to have supervised
visitation, state agencies do not always permit sibling visita-
tions.68 Hugo, for example, was originally placed in a foster home
where he had no family relations, and likely had visitation with
his parents but not his sister, who had been placed in a different
foster home.69 This is the point at which the state can make or
break a family. Had the state placed Hugo with Ms. L initially,
or at least allowed him to visit with Gloria, the state would have
created a sibling attachment which is particularly important
when the state destroys the parent-child relationship. Such an
outcome is certainly preferable to what the state did in Hugo's
case initially: failing to allow Gloria and Hugo to form a sibling
bond which could last the rest of their lives.
C. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearings
At the adjudicatory hearing, the state has the burden of es-
tablishing the truth of the allegations of abuse or neglect, either
by a preponderance of the evidence 70 or by clear and convincing
evidence, 71 depending on the jurisdiction. If the allegations in the
petition are found to be true, the court must determine whether
to return the child to his or her parents' home, continue with the
same placement, or place the child in another facility or foster
home.72 The burden of proof necessary to establish the truth of
the charges is not applicable to the decision regarding the child's
in the foster care system for lengthy periods of time, moving from one foster home to
another).
67 Hort, Note, 28 Fordham Urban L J at 1917 (cited in note 66) (noting that foster
children are moved from one foster home to another specifically to "decrease the chance of
substantial attachments developing between the foster child and his foster parents").
68 See Cal Welf & Inst Code § 306.5 (giving a social worker discretion, when taking a
minor into custody, not to place that minor with any siblings, if the worker provides a
report justifying the denial of co-placement); see also Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 747
and n 7 (cited in note 20) (citing Weber v Weber, 534 A2d 498 (Pa Sup 1987)) (noting that
at least one court has held that adult siblings do not have standing to seek visitation
rights with the minor siblings still living with their parents).
69 Adoption of Hugo, 700 NE2d 516 (Mass 1998).
70 See, for example, Fla Stat § 39.507(b) (West 2003) (requiring that findings of de-
pendency be by a preponderance of the evidence).
71 See, for example, NC Gen Stat Ann § 7B-805 (Lexis 2003) (mandating clear and
convincing evidence at adjudicatory hearings in dependency proceedings).
72 See, for example, Tex Fam Code § 262.201 (requiring the court to order the return
of the child to the appropriate individuals).
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placement. 73 Usually the child will remain in the same place-
ment that the court selected after the emergency hearing until
the court holds a dispositional hearing. If the department of so-
cial services has not yet developed a service plan for the family,
and it is appropriate to do so, the department will develop and
present such a plan at the dispositional hearing.7 4
At the dispositional hearing, which often immediately fol-
lows the adjudicatory hearing especially if the service plan has
already been developed, the court must approve either the reuni-
fication plan, which may take up to twelve months, or a plan to
terminate parental rights and provide permanent care for the
child.7 5 If the latter occurs, a date is set for the termination hear-
ing. At the dispositional hearing, the court may also decide
whether the current placement for the child is still appropriate.7 6
Usually no standard of proof governs the court's placement deci-
sions,77 and sometimes children are moved to other homes or fa-
cilities for unclear reasons. Such decisions are basically unre-
viewable because they are merely interim rulings rather than
73 See, for example, Tex Fain Code § 262.201 (noting that the standard for determin-
ing the child's placement is whether there exists "sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of
ordinary prudence and caution" that there is a danger to the child's health or welfare).
After the emergency removal of the child and prior to the adjudicatory hearing, the
child welfare worker (if he is a good one and is not overwhelmed by a huge caseload) will
attempt to develop a service plan with the parents in order to assist with reunification of
the family over the next twelve months. In some cases this proves difficult because the
parents' attorneys may advise their clients not to cooperate with the welfare authorities
for fear that their participation in creating a service plan will be considered an admission
of guilt. See Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of
Children and the Adversary System, 52 U Miami L Rev 79, 129-30 & n 166-67 (1997)
(noting that parents will see acceptance of a service plan as an "admission of guilt," and
that parents' attorneys will often encourage the parent to be uncooperative, in the inter-
est of denying the existence of any abuse or neglect). In certain instances, however, such
as if the parents have murdered another child, the state will usually move for an immedi-
ate permanent plan, which may include termination of parental rights over all of the
parents' children. See, for example, Tex Fain Code § 262.2015 (West 2003) (providing
examples of "aggravated circumstances" which permit the state to move immediately to a
permanency hearing without affording the parents a service plan or reasonable efforts for
reunification).
74 See, for example, NY Fam Ct Act § 1052(b)(1)(A) (McKinney 2003) (noting that at
the dispositional hearing the court will find as to whether reasonable efforts are being
made to develop a permanency plan, and will determine what type of plan is appropriate).
75 See, for example, NY Fam Ct Act § 1052(a) (McKinney 2003) (listing the various
orders the court can make at the end of a dispositional hearing).
76 See, for example, NY Fam Ct Act § 1052(b)(1)(A).
77 See, for example, NY Fam Ct Act §§ 1052, 1055(b)(i)(A) (McKinney 2003) (stating
that the court can place the children back in the parents' home, in the custody of a rela-
tive, or in the custody of child welfare, as long as it is in the child's best interests and
reasonable efforts were made to keep the child in the home).
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final judgments. The shifting of children in this way can cause
emotional damage, in some cases leaving the children unable or
unwilling to form attachments. If the siblings are separated they
feel isolated and are unable to develop the emotional support
that comes from the sibling relationship.
In the context of establishing permanent care, most jurisdic-
tions recognize the importance of the sibling relationship. In
some states, the department is simply urged to try and put sib-
lings in the same placement.78 In others the statutes create a
rebuttable presumption that keeping siblings together serves the
best interests of the children.7 9 In a few jurisdictions, siblings
must remain together absent clear and convincing evidence that
it would harm the children or would not serve the best interests
of one or more of the children to remain together.80 Although
most jurisdictions recognize the strength and value of the sibling
bond in their statutory schemes, unless a statute mandates that
the children be kept together absent the showing of harm to the
children, siblings are often placed in separate foster or adoptive
homes. The less urgent language of most statutes permits the
state greater flexibility in disrupting sibling groups. Few, if any,
of these states protect sibling relationships as effectively and suf-
ficiently as the measures I advocate in Part IV.
D. Permanency Hearings
If the child has been removed from the home, but the state is
working towards reunification, a court must hold a permanency
hearing within twelve months of the initial removal.8' If the par-
ents have complied with the reunification plan, the court will
order the child to be returned to the parents within the twelve-
month period.8 2 The court can grant the parents up to six addi-
tional months to satisfy the requirements of the reunification
plan if the parents have shown substantial compliance with it.83
78 See, for example, Fla Stat § 39.001(k) (West 2002) (requiring that the state merely
make an effort to keep siblings together).
79 See, for example, NY Fam Ct Act § 1027-a (stating that placement of siblings to-
gether is presumed to be in the child's best interests).
80 See W Va Code § 49-2-14(e) (2003).
81 See, for example, Cal Welf& Inst Code § 366.21(f) (West 2003) (mandating that the
permanency hearing be held within twelve months after the child is removed from paren-
tal care).
82 See, for example, Cal Welf& Inst Code § 361.2 (West 2003).
83 See, for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code § 366.21(g)(1) (allowing for a six month
continuance of the permanency hearing if it is found that reasonable services had not
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If the parents have failed at reunification, the court will or-
der a termination of parental rights hearing.8 4 Before that ter-
mination hearing, the state may once again move the child to
another placement, sometimes because the foster home can no
longer keep the child, or because the child needs a higher or
lower level of care than what he or she is currently receiving. It
was at this point in the process that Hugo was moved to Ms. L's
home, which allowed him and his sister to form the sibling
bond.85
Not all abuse and neglect cases result in termination.86
Many children return home, possibly with some state supervision
to insure the child's safety.8 7 But newspaper stories of children
who have been murdered by their parents after they have been
returned home provide vivid reminders that resources are scarce
and huge caseloads prevent extensive supervision in most
cases.88
E. Termination Hearing
At the termination hearing, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, the state must first prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the parents have committed specific harmful acts or
omissions towards the child. 89 These harms can include parental
behavior during the child's placement outside the home. Once
been provided by the department or if there is "substantial probability" the child can be
returned home within the next six months).
84 See, for example, Cal Welf& Inst Code § 366.21(2).
85 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 516.
86 One study examined the number of children exiting foster care during Fiscal Year
2001, and found that 57 percent of these children were reunified with their parents, and
only 18 percent were adopted. See Foster Care National Statistics, National Clearing-
house on Child Abuse and Neglect Information 1, 3 (2003) available online at
<http-//nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/foster.cfm> (visited May 3, 2004).
87 Id.
88 See Truth is Elusive on Abused Children, Newsday 50 (Nov 20, 1997) (discussing
various cases in New York City in which the Department of Child Welfare knew of ongo-
ing abuse in the home, either left the children in the home or allowed for unsupervised
visitation, and the child died while in the parents' care). In DeShaney v Winnebago De-
partment of Social Services, 489 US 189 (1989), the Supreme Court held that it did not
violate due process for the child welfare agency not to remove a child being severely
abused while living with his father. The majority concluded that since the child was not
in state custody there was no obligation to protect him. Id at 199-201. What if the child is
in foster care? See Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due
Process Right to Safety, 69 NC L Rev 113 (1990) (arguing that when the state places a
child in a foster home it constitutes custody for purposes of due process).
89 See Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982) (holding that the standard of proof for
terminating parental rights must, at a minimum, be clear and convincing).
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the court makes that factual determination, some states require
additional evidence before the parents' rights can be terminated.
States use different standards in the termination segment of
the hearing. Some jurisdictions require proof that termination
serves the best interests of the child,90 proof that the child can be
adopted, 91 or proof that termination of the parent-child bond will
not be detrimental to the child.92 At this proceeding, the parent is
not constitutionally entitled to counsel absent extenuating cir-
cumstances. 93 However, most jurisdictions statutorily provide
indigent parents with counsel.94 Partly because states pursue
only the most egregious cases, most termination proceedings re-
sult in termination.95 Those statutes that permit termination-if
in the best interests of the child-without any other require-
ments, such as adoptability, can result in children becoming or-
phans both in fact and under the law.
With respect to children whose parents' rights have been
terminated, if the children are deemed to be adoptable, and they
had previously not been placed in a pre-adoptive home, their
placement, depending on the jurisdiction, will most likely
change. 96 Older children or children with special needs are diffi-
90 See, for example, Tex Fam Code § 161.001(2) (West 2003) (stating that in addition
to finding unfitness, the court must also determine that termination is in the child's best
interests).
91 See, for example, Cal Welf& Inst Code § 366.21(i)(6) (requiring an agency report to
include information regarding a child's adoptability if parental rights are terminated).
92 See, for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code § 366.26(c)(1)(A) (stating that if the parents
had continued visitation with the child and the child benefited from that visitation, ter-
mination of parental rights may not be appropriate).
93 Lassiter v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 18 (1981) (holding that al-
though parental interest in the care, custody, and control of children was strong, due
process did not require appointment of counsel in all termination proceedings, but rather
should be determined on a case-by-case basis).
94 See, for example, Tex Fam Code § 107.013(a)(1) (West 2003) (calling for appoint-
ment of counsel for an indigent parent opposing termination of parental rights).
95 However, there are times that termination is not appropriate, yet Child Protective
Services will seek termination and usually succeed. For example, there was a case in the
legal clinic at the University of Houston Law Center in which the children had been out
of home for over three years. The mother had continued contact with the children, whose
ages ranged from six to sixteen years old. All of the children were bonded with the
mother, had special needs, and were very unlikely to be adopted. The mother had been in
therapy for the previous two years and her therapist testified that she had made remark-
able improvement. The children wanted to remain in contact with the mother, but paren-
tal rights were terminated. The department concentrated on two factors to obtain termi-
nation: first, the early abuse that occurred prior to the children entering the system, and
second, the fact that the mother was a lesbian.
96 See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends To Accelerate the Termina-
tion of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States,
29 Fam L Q 121, 136-37 (1995) (explaining how children may be repeatedly moved from
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cult to place for adoption, and their placements are often shifted
in the attempt to find an adoptive home.97
If a child is not adopted, the court holds a review hearing
every six months until the child reaches majority.98 At the age of
eighteen, or after the child has completed high school, the state
releases the child from its custody with little or no follow-up care
or services. 99 However, even if a court denies the petition for
termination, the court still holds a separate permanency plan-
ning hearing at which the court determines the child's long term
care and custody. 100 In other words, the parents may still retain
parental rights, but not physical custody of their children. As
with temporary placements,'' states' standards for placement
review vary. The majority of jurisdictions require only that the
placement continue to serve the child's best interests. 10 2
F. Adoption
If children are to be adopted, the court holds an adoption
hearing 10 3 in which the former parents have no legal rights or
standing.'0 4 However, they are sometimes behind the scenes, as
in the Hugo case, hoping that if a relative can adopt the child,
they will still be able to see the child or spirit him or her away.
one foster home to another after parental rights are terminated).
97 See Susan L. Brooks, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of
Permanency Planning for Children With Special Needs, 66 NYU L Rev 1130, 1132 (1991)
(stating that 60 percent of children waiting for adoption have special needs and that only
one-third will be placed for adoption within a year; the remaining children face the "foster
care drift").
98 See, for example, Tex Fam Code § 263.501 (West 2003) (requiring that a review
hearing be held every six months if parental rights are not terminated). But see NY Fam
Ct Act § 1055(b)(i) (stating that placements only need to be reviewed annually).
99 NY Fam Ct Act § 1055(e) (permitting jurisdiction over a child until the age of
eighteen, without the child's consent, and between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one if
the child consents); Fla Stat § 39.521(d) (2003) (directing that the court cannot continue
jurisdiction past the age of eighteen); NY Fam Ct Act § 1055(b)(iv)(B)(6) (McKinney 2004)
(providing services for a child of sixteen years old and older to assist in the transition
from foster care to independent living).
100 See, for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code §§ 366.26(1), (3-4) (describing the options
available to the court in deciding the long-range plan for the child: adoption, guardian-
ship, or long-term foster care).
101 See text at supra notes 78-80.
102 See, for example, Tex Fam Code § 263.501 (stating that review hearings are held to
insure that placements remain appropriate).
103 See, for example, Cal Welf & Inst Code § 366.26(e) (setting the matter for an adop-
tion hearing after termination of parental rights).
104 Interest of McAda, 780 SW2d 307 (Tex App 1989) (holding that a failure to give a
mother a copy of an adoption report was not a denial of due process since the mother's
parental rights had been terminated).
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Although the parents are not entitled to know the name and ad-
dress of the adoptive parents, if a relative adopts, it is in fact an
open adoption. 10 5 Once someone adopts a child, the state agency
no longer plays a role in his or her life, unless allegations of
abuse arise against the adoptive parents. Then, the process be-
gins again. 10 6
II. ADOPTION OF HuGo
The trial judge in Hugo held two consecutive hearings that
merged into one another: a hearing regarding the termination of
parental rights and the proceeding regarding the boy's adop-
tion. 0 7 Only the latter ruling was appealed. 08 At the adoption
proceeding, the judge listened to eight days of testimony from
mental health experts, child protection workers, Hugo's parents,
and the paternal aunt, Ms. J.109 The parents were drug addicts;
indeed Hugo was born with cocaine in his system, and had devel-
opmental lags and behavioral problems that required early in-
tervention. 10 The parents strongly supported the aunt's request
for adoption."' Based on all of the testimony, the judge deter-
mined, contrary to D.S.S.'s recommendation, that the aunt would
be the best to care for and raise Hugo." 2 Ms. L, at D.S.S.'s sug-
105 See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. and Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unre-
solved Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 Villanova L R
169, 194 (2004) (noting the existence of the theory of open adoption, which involves a
scenario where "some form of post-adoption visitation exists between the child and its
biological parents").
106 Lydia Polgreen and Robert Worth, New Jersey Couple Held in Abuse Case, NY
Times Al (Oct 27, 2003) (reporting that a couple who had adopted four boys were starving
the children, and that the abuse had not been discovered by the Division of Youth and
Family Services even though agency personnel had visited the home thirty-eight times).
107 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 518. The juvenile court conducted a hearing on the merits
concerning the care and protection petition for Hugo and committed him to the perma-
nent custody of D.S.S. Id. All parties agreed to vacate this first order and place the issues
before a new judge. Id. The second trial took place between August and December of 1997,
and the judge conducted a fitness and placement hearing. Id. In February of 1998, the
judge also issued a decree finding both parents unfit and dispensing with consent of ei-
ther parent for any subsequent adoption petitions. Hugo, 700 NE2d at 518. The next
month, the judge issued an order finding that it would be in Hugo's best interests to be
adopted by his paternal aunt. Id. By the commencement of the second trial, Hugo had
lived with his foster mother and sister for approximately one year. Id at 519.
108 Id at 518 (noting that the trial court's holding of parental unfitness was unchal-
lenged).
109 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 518 n 3.
110 Id at 518 n 4.
111 Id at 518 n 3.
112 Id at 518. See also Smith v Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Re-
form, 431 US 816 (1977) (holding that the associational relationship between foster par-
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
gestion, did not testify.113 The trial judge recognized Hugo's at-
tachment to his sister and foster mother, the importance of sib-
lings being together, the love and care the foster mom had pro-
vided to Hugo, and the fact that Hugo would be moving away
from everyone and everything he knew in order to live with his
aunt. 114 These factors, however, did not outweigh the long-term
benefits that the judge believed would derive from the aunt's
adoption of Hugo.115 The Massachusetts statute in effect at that
time provided that children should remain with biological family
when possible and that the state should use all resources avail-
able to try and maintain the biological family unit.116 The judge
noted, however, that Gloria and Hugo had never lived together
with their parents, although they had done so in Ms. L's home. 117
Ms. J was raising a son with learning and physical disabili-
ties and understood how to care for a child with special needs."l 8
The judge thought that she was better prepared to assure that
Hugo kept his appointments and received all necessary services,
and that she could work with Hugo independently on remedying
his deficits. 119 There was also testimony, however, that Ms. L,
who did not work outside the home, also took Hugo to all of his
appointments. 120 Nothing indicated that she would not continue
doing so. 12 1 Ms. L also read to Hugo regularly to help him with
his educational development. 122
The judge did not specifically state that the class difference
between Ms. L and the aunt influenced his decision.123 Ms. L.
made her living by being a foster parent. 124 This led the judge to
conclude that there would be too much instability for Hugo in a
house with foster children coming and going. 125 Hugo's aunt, on
ent and child was insufficient to guarantee the foster parent anything more than the
right to request an "independent review" of any placement change).
113 Id at 521 n 11.
114 Id at 520.
115 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 520-22.
116 Id at 523 n 17 (discussing chapter 210, § 3(c)(vii) of the Massachusetts general
laws).
117 Id at 524 & n 19.
118 Id at 519.
119 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 519-20.
120 Id at 519.
121 Id.
122 Id at 519.
123 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 521.
124 Id at 519.
125 Id at 521 n 10, 522.
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the other hand, was employed by the police department. 126 Her
fianc6, with whom she was living, was an electrician.127 The aunt
was raising a cousin and her son. 28 The judge was apparently
unconcerned that the aunt, who did work outside the home,
would be raising two special needs children simultaneously,
thereby increasing the parental workload and heightening family
tensions.
In an odd twist, the judge alluded to the possibility that
Hugo's natural parents could still visit him if the aunt adopted
him. 29 Since the parents' rights had been terminated for unfit-
ness, it is unclear why that fact served as a positive factor in the
decision to allow the aunt to adopt. It would appear that the pos-
sibility of parental contact would favor the adoption of Hugo by
Ms. L. Indeed, judges often refuse family adoptions because of
the concern that the parents will have unlimited, unsupervised
access to the child, or will actually be the ones raising the child.
The intermediate appellate court in Massachusetts reversed
the trial court's decision. 30 The appellate court argued that Hugo
had formed a strong bond with his caretaker, would be well cared
for in Ms. L's home, and would have the additional advantage of
remaining in the same residence with his sister.'31 The court also
commented on the experts' testimony that Hugo needed consis-
tency and did not react well to change.' 32 It may be that the
aunt's superior financial situation would allow her to offer Hugo
more material objects and access to resources; however, it was
speculative whether the aunt could fulfill Hugo's emotional
needs.' 33 The appellate court opinion did not state whether the
126 Id at 519.
127 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 519.
128 Id.
129 Hugo, 694 NE2d 377, 379 (Mass App 1998) (noting the trial court's order that the
paternal aunt allow the child to visit with his biological parents if the aunt considers
them to be sober and healthy enough for such a visit).
130 Id at 380.
131 Id at 378.
132 Id at 380.
133 Hugo, 694 NE2d at 380. It is not clear what additional benefits the aunt may have
been able to provide Hugo. Although she had been raising a special needs child, it does
not necessarily follow that she would be able to provide Hugo with more educational or
psychological benefits than Ms. L could provide. The aunt had the responsibility of two
children and worked full time. Hugo, 700 NE2d at 519. Ms. L was a stay-at-home mother,
deriving her income from foster care. Id at 521 & n 10. The indication may have been that
the aunt's income was greater than Ms. L's, but there was no information regarding the
expenses that beth parties had. Ms. L had the advantage of already having provided
Hugo with a secure, nurturing environment. Any benefits that might come from moving
319] 339
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
aunt had ever visited with Hugo or whether she had tried to
adopt Gloria. Nor is there any information in the opinion as to
whether the parents had challenged Gloria's adoption.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed the intermedi-
ate appellate court's decision primarily because the latter had
invaded the trial court's discretion. 134 The trial judge had the
best opportunity to evaluate the testimony and the evidence sup-
ported the trial court decision. 135 The fact that Hugo would be
separated from his sibling was simply one circumstance in the
overall assessment of his best interests.136
The courts did not address two major issues in Hugo. First,
do children have a fundamental right to maintain a relationship
with biological siblings? Second, if so, what standard should the
court use when deciding whether to terminate or restrict that
sibling relationship? The intermediate appellate court did not
address the first question at all. It focused only on the benefits to
Hugo of staying in a familiar placement versus the speculative
future benefits that Hugo might gain through adoption by his
aunt. 37 The state supreme court recognized that the siblings had
developed a strong bond, but focused on the fact that sufficient
evidence supported the trial judge's decision to place Hugo with
his aunt for adoption. 138
III. SIBLINGS AND THE CONSTITUTION
Since the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court has held
that parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody and
control of their children.139 In Meyer v Nebraska,140 followed
shortly by Pierce v Society of Sisters,'4' the Court found that the
involvement of parents in the upbringing of their children out-
Hugo out of Ms. L's home were speculative.
134 Id at 521.
135 Id.
136 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 524 & n 21.
137 Hugo, 694 NE2d at 380.
138 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 524.
139 See, for example, Emily Buss, "Parental" Rights, 88 Va L Rev 635, 655 (2002) (not-
ing that the Supreme Court first recognized parents' fundamental right to child-rearing
in the 1920s with its decisions in Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923), and Pierce v
Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925)). Buss observes that prior to Troxel v Granville, 530
US 57 (2000), a grandparent visitation case, the Court had directly addressed this core
right in only four cases: Meyer, Pierce, Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944), and
Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972). Id.
140 262 US 390 (1923).
141 268 US 510 (1925).
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weighs the state's interests in fostering a homogenous society. 142
In a later case, the Court held that parents had the right, under
certain circumstances, to discontinue their children's education
in violation of state law. 143 "[Tihe integrity of the family unit"
prompted the Court to require that the state give an unwed fa-
ther, who had lived with his offspring, a due process hearing to
determine his fitness to raise his children.1 4 The father's inter-
est trumped the state's concern for administrative convenience: it
was simply "more convenient to presume than to prove" that un-
wed fathers were unfit.145
The Court's view of the importance and value of the family
unit applies not only to parent-child relationships, but also to
extended family ties. In Moore v East Cleveland,146 a plurality
invalidated a city ordinance that permitted "intrusive regulation
of the family," because the "right to live together as a family" ex-
tended beyond the parent-child relationship-in Moore, between
grandparent and grandchildren and between cousins. 147
Troxel v Granville148 appears to denigrate the grandpar-
ent/grandchild relationship. 149 The plurality and other opinions,
however, do not settle questions regarding visitations between
children and grandparents in all contexts,150 and the case does
not in any way settle all of the issues dealing with grandparents'
or other family members' unique relationships, particularly when
the state becomes involved in separating family members. Since
Troxel, many jurisdictions have given greater deference to paren-
142 Meyer, 262 US at 402; Pierce, 268 US at 534-35.
143 Consider Yoder, 406 US at 205 (holding that the state could not prevent Amish
parents from removing their children from public school after the eighth grade). But in
Prince, 321 US at 158, where the court upheld a guardian's conviction under the child-
labor statute because she allowed her ward to sell religious tracts on the streets at night.
The Court stated that the interest of society in protecting the welfare of the child over-
rode a guardian's or parent's right to raise his child as he or she sees fit. Id at 166, 170.
14 Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 651, 658 (1972).
145 Id at 658. Biological connection does not, however, always dictate the result of
contests between parents and the state. In Michael H v Gerald D, 491 US 110 (1989), a
plurality of the Court held that a biological father's right to visitation with his child, born
while the mother was married to another man, must yield to a state presumption that a
child born during a marriage is a child of the marriage. Id at 125-29.
146 431 US 494 (1977) (plurality).
147 Id at 499-500. The local zoning ordinance prohibited a grandmother from residing
with her grandchildren who had different parents. Id.
148 530 US 57 (2000) (plurality).
149 Id at 72-75.
150 Marrus, 43 Ariz L Rev at 793 (cited in note 28) (noting the narrowness of the
Troxel opinion).
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tal wishes when determining if grandparents can have access to
their grandchildren."' These states and judges are probably
reading more into Troxel than is warranted. The plurality ad-
dressed only a one-of-a-kind, broad state statute which gave "any
person" the right to petition for visitation at "any time" and per-
mitted the court to grant visitation if it would serve the best in-
terests of the child. The plurality took special care to note it was
not "defin[ing] today the precise scope of the parental Due Proc-
ess right in the visitation context."152 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor, who wrote the plurality opinion, noted her agreement
with Justice Kennedy that results would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case.'
The Court has not spoken explicitly on the issue of siblings,
but that relationship is as important as the ones between grand-
parents and grandchildren and between cousins. 154 Several lower
courts have alluded to the unique relationship of siblings and the
state's duty to protect that bond.155
As I have noted elsewhere, sibling "relationships can provide
emotional security, affect the intelligence, social, emotional, and
moral development of [the siblings] and offer lifetime companion-
ship .... Given the eminent worth of this relationship, it is in
151 For example, we are finding that the judges in Harris County, Texas are refusing
to allow grandparents access against the parents' wishes even though the statute would
permit it.
152 Troxel, 530 US at 73.
153 Id
154 Marrus, 66 Tenn L Rev at 1015-18 (cited in note 27) (arguing that it is not rational
to grant access to grandparents but not to siblings, when studies show that the sibling
relationship may be the most important personal bond in a person's life).
155 See In re Jamie P, 2003 WL 1154197 (Cal App) (noting California's statute man-
dating that the sibling relationship be maintained--even if one child is adoptable-unless
there is clear and convincing evidence otherwise); In re Guardianship of Jordan, 764 A2d
503 (NJ App 2001) (weighing bond between sisters very heavily when making a place-
ment determination). Compare In re Daniel W, 529 NW2d 548, 553 (Neb App 1995) (af-
firming trial court's decision to order visitation between siblings, although the juvenile
court did not have direct jurisdiction over the sister). The court in Daniel W reasoned that
it had jurisdiction over the parents and could order them to facilitate visitation between
the siblings based on the best interests of Daniel W. Id at 555. The Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed and vacated the visitation order. In Interest of DW, 542 NW2d 407, 410
(Neb 1996) (holding that a juvenile court cannot interfere with parental rights over a non-
adjudicated child if the court does not have jurisdiction over that child). See also Leslie
Boellstorff, State Justices Weigh Rights in Sibling Visits, Omaha World Herald 1 (Nov 4,
1995). Parents turned their son over to juvenile court for foster care when he was thirteen
years old. Id. At the age of seventeen, the child sought visitation with his four-year-old
sister. Id. The parents denied visitation and argued that it would harm their daughter.
Id. The newspaper stated that the biggest issue was determining whether the court could
enforce visitation without also taking jurisdiction over the younger sister. Boellstorff,
State Justices Weigh Rights, Omaha World Herald at 2.
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the best interests of children and society to weigh all factors
carefully before disturbing this [unique kinship] ."1586
Certainly, if we assume the sibling relationship to be of fun-
damental importance, the state's burden when it attempts to de-
stroy or dilute that relationship should be very heavy, particu-
larly when the siblings experience the additional loss of parents,
as they often do in dependency and termination proceedings. The
Court has imposed a heavy burden when the state attempts to
terminate parental rights. 57 The clear and convincing standard
of proof insures greater accuracy in ferreting out which parent-
child relationships should be destroyed. This accuracy is war-
ranted because the state, the parents, and the children all have a
strong interest in avoiding wrongful terminations. Is there any
reason that sibling relationships should not be protected in the
same way? Unlike intergenerational connections, sibling rela-
tionships usually span a lifetime and involve common family his-
tory. Long after parents die, siblings can continue to create new
family ties, stories, and histories.
The clear and convincing standard of proof constitutionally
mandated in termination proceedings does not, however, always
apply to placement or adoption decisions. 58 If it had applied in
Hugo, the state agency probably would have removed at least one
of the children living in Ms. L's home so that Hugo could have
been with his sister immediately after his birth. If that was not
feasible at that time, he could have been moved to Ms. L's home
sooner than he was. Had the higher standard of proof applied in
Hugo's adoption hearing, it is very questionable whether the
state supreme court would have upheld the trial judge's determi-
nation to place Hugo with an unknown aunt-with whom he
shared a blood kinship, but not a psychological bond.
Instead of the clear and convincing standard of proof in deci-
sions regarding post-termination placements, state statutes
156 Marrus, 66 Tenn L Rev at 987 (cited in note 27).
157 Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982) (holding that due process requires a state to
meet the clear and convincing standard in termination proceedings). See also MLB v SLJ,
519 US 102 (1996) (holding that the state cannot deny an indigent parent the right to
appellate review of termination of parental rights due to her inability to pay for a tran-
script).
158 See 42 USC § 675(5)(A) (2003) (mandating that the standard for placement deci-
sions must be based on the child's best interests and special needs). See also In re LL, 625
A2d 559, 564 (NJ App 1993) (determining that child placement is based on the best inter-
ests standard); In re Dependency of AC, 873 P2d 535, 539 (Wash App 1994) (stating that
the paramount concern in placement decisions is the best interests of the child, which in
turn is based on various factors).
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merely require that the court adhere to the best interests of the
child standard, and simply list the factors to be considered by the
judge in making the ruling.159 This does little to provide guid-
ance, avoid arbitrariness, and assure protection of the special
sibling relationship. Indeed, had the trial judge in Hugo decided
the case differently, that judgment, presumably, would also have
been upheld by the state supreme court. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Court ruling in Hugo effectively insulates the trial judge's
decision from any effective appellate review. 160 If the case had
been heard by a different judge, or even by the same judge on a
different day, Hugo might have remained in Ms. L's home with
his sibling.
Such irrational factors as the personality and idiosyncrasies
of judges are endemic in the law, but the particular vagueness of
the statutes governing the lives of children in this context make
the vagaries of law even more extreme. Had the court allowed
Ms. L to adopt Hugo, arguably Hugo, Gloria, the aunt, and Ms. L
all would have benefited more than they did from the actual
judgment imposed. Hugo and Gloria would have remained to-
gether with a woman who obviously loved them. Hugo would
have been spared another wrenching tear in his chaotic life. The
aunt concededly would have provided a good home for Hugo, but
one wonders why she had not tried previously to adopt Gloria or
visit with Gloria and Hugo. As an aunt, she could seek a court
order permitting her to visit with both Hugo and Gloria, 161 and
could provide additional support without worrying that the par-
ents, who had been deemed unfit, would attempt to regain care of
Hugo by legal or other means. The parents may have considered
that possibility when they supported the aunt in her quest for
adoption. Indeed, it is not unusual for unfit parents to take their
children unlawfully from the adoptive relative, knowing that the
159 See, for example, Iowa Code Ann § 232.21(2) (West 2003) (using the best interests
standard in child placement decisions); Kan Stat Ann § 38-1584 (2003) (basing placement
preference on best interests standard); Cal Welf & Inst Code § 361.3(a) (West 2003) (re-
quiring that relative-kinship placement be based on the best interests standard and list-
ing various factors that the court and department considers in this determination).
160 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 521-22 (holding that the proper standard of review of the trial
court's decision involves evaluating "whether the trial judge abused his discretion or
committed a clear error of law," thus deferring to the trial court on almost all matters of
factual analysis and interest-balancing).
161 Ms. L, as the adoptive parent, could refuse the aunt visitation. However, the court
could order it to take place as being in the children's best interests. The court encouraged
the aunt to allow Gloria to visit with Hugo after she adopted him, but did not provide any
resources to insure that this would occur. Id at 518.
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relative will not likely report them to the police. 162 Had the stat-
ute mandated the importance of keeping siblings together, and
required a heavy burden of proof before disturbing that relation-
ship, Hugo's best interests would have been better served.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR KEEPING THE SIBLING RELATIONSHIP INTACT
IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Research indicates that the sibling connection is one of, if
not the, most important kinship bond that exists between family
members-even including the parent-child relationship. 163 This
is true for intact families, and the benefits of sibling connections
assume an even greater importance for children who have been
removed from parental care.'6 Finding solutions that would al-
low siblings to remain together during dependency and termina-
tion proceedings is not an easy task. It must be attempted, how-
ever, if the emotional well-being of children enmeshed in the
throes of a dependency case is going to be protected in a realistic
way.
From the beginning of the dependency process, even at the
emergency removal hearings, brothers and sisters should be kept
together. Federal regulations and state statutes should mandate
such preferences. The state should bear the burden of proving
that breaking sibling connections serves the best interests of the
child by clear and convincing evidence, even though the emer-
gency removal hearing takes place at a time when the state
agency may know little about the family-a factor that conced-
edly militates in favor of a mere preponderance of the evidence
standard. However, because early placements have abiding im-
pacts on later decisions regarding the child's placement,' 65 the
162 See John W. May, Utah Kinship Placements: Considering the Intergenerational
Cycle of Domestic Violence Against Children, 22 J Contemp L 97, 134 n 147 (1996) (stat-
ing that relatives who adopt may allow access to the biological parents whose rights have
been terminated-a situation that non-relative foster or adoptive parents would almost
certainly not permit). May notes that children may be reabused or reneglected by their
parents in such scenarios, and that this is a primary concern in kinship placements. Id at
134.
163 See Marrus, 66 Tenn L Rev at 981-82 (cited in note 27) (describing the sibling bond
and stating that over a lifetime siblings will generally interact more with each other than
with their parents).
164 Id at 984-87 (discussing the benefits of the sibling bond and how it affects the
child's development and learning process, and how it nurtures and supports children
within the sibling group).
165 See Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 758 (cited in note 20) (highlighting studies that
show the initial placement of siblings is one of the most important factors in determining
319] 345
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
court must take heightened care to assure an appropriate early
placement-one that can continue and can provide a permanent
home for the child, if appropriate.
Keeping siblings together is the lesser gamble in this con-
text, certainly more so than wrongfully separating them. Only
extraordinary circumstances should permit the state to separate
siblings. For example, a brother and sister should be placed in
different homes or facilities if the boy has sexually abused his
sibling. In that situation, the safety of the child obviously comes
before the importance of the sibling relationship.
Sometimes, however, sibling relationships present difficult
issues that will not be readily solved by my proposed solution.
For example, if one child is removed from the family and the
other children remain in the family home, the former should be
placed in a foster home that is prepared to accept the other sib-
lings, should that become necessary. If one member of the sibling
group has special needs, the state agency should have foster
homes that can care for all of the children in a family, with or
without special needs. If one or more members of the sibling
group were removed from the home at an earlier time, the court
should place the sibling currently falling under dependency pro-
ceedings in the same home as the previously removed children.
Perhaps if the state initially had placed Hugo with his sister in
Ms. L's home, then Hugo and his sister would have had even
more time to bond, and the trial judge may have rendered a dif-
ferent decision.
In other cases, one member of a sibling group may need a
higher level of care than the others. One child may have suffered
longer and more severe abuse and may need residential treat-
ment or placement in a mental institution. The state could pro-
vide the appropriate level of care for the child with the intent of
reunifying the sibling group after treatment was completed. Un-
der these circumstances, it would be imperative, depending on
the extent of the emotional damage, for the state to arrange for
meaningful and frequent visitation between members of the sib-
ling group in order to assist with a smooth transition later.
Troubling issues also may arise when members of the sibling
group come from different racial backgrounds. Although I am
generally against transracial adoptions for reasons independent
whether they will be adopted together or otherwise reunited).
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of the issues discussed here, 166 I recognize the importance of
evaluating the individual needs of each child. I do not advocate
the division of the sibling group to ensure racial matching. Under
current law, however, such division is made more likely. For ex-
ample, the Indian Child Welfare Act ("I.C.W.A.") gives tribal na-
tions exclusive rights in determining the placement of any Indian
child. 167 These exclusive rights can be further complicated if the
children come from different tribes or one or more members of
the sibling group are of non-Indian racial make-up. 68 Language
could be added to the federal I.C.W.A. to mandate that if the
tribe desires to take jurisdiction over the Indian child, they must
also take jurisdiction over the non-Indian children. This position
is concededly difficult to maintain given the autonomy of Indian
tribes and the importance to the tribes in maintaining closeness.
If an agency subsequently wants to separate siblings, it
should address the relevant issues at a hearing. Courts should
hear and afford great weight to siblings' feelings about remain-
ing together, and the change should not occur without clear and
convincing evidence that the new arrangement is best for all the
children. Of course, I do not expect the state to maintain a
placement that is harmful to one or more of the children in order
to keep the sibling group together. But, when feasible, the agency
should facilitate visitation between siblings, and such visitation
should be made a condition of the change in placement. In these
situations, each child should have separate counsel who can in-
166 Except for the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC § 1911(a) (2003), federal law
mandates, as a condition of funding, that race cannot be a factor for adoption placement if
it will interfere with the timely adoption of the child. See 42 USCA § 671(a)(18) (West
1998). This provision was included because it is believed that there are an insufficient
number of African-Americans who want to adopt African-American children. See Scott
Baldaut, More African-Americans Reach Out to Adopt, Christian Science Monitor (Oct 12,
2000) (stating that many African-Americans distrust state agencies, and therefore do not
look at adoption). There are various reasons why this insufficiency exists, and much has
to do with matters of state inaction. States could take measures to ensure that there are
sufficient African-American homes for African-American children by, for example, provid-
ing payments for low-income families who adopt, such as those given to foster parents
adopting special needs children or relatives who are able to collect benefits after they
have adopted a child of a relative. In addition, the state could consider waiving some
screening conditions that would not endanger the child's welfare. The author discusses
several methods that agencies have been using to encourage African-American adoptions.
Id.
167 25 USC § 1911(a).
168 Id (mandating that custody proceedings concerning Indian children are subject to
the jurisdiction of tribal courts, but without providing a resolution for the reconciliation of
different tribal systems or for part-Indian children).
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vestigate the facts and advocate each child's position.169 The
state would have to show that it made all reasonable efforts to
keep the siblings together. However, in the end, it may be that
for the emotional well-being of one child, it is better to remain
with his or her brothers and sisters while to protect another child
from harm it may be necessary to separate the child from the
other siblings. In this Scylla-Charybdis scenario, the latter child
should prevail because it is the only way to prevent harm to that
child. Thus, the likelihood of harm to one child trumps the possi-
bility of emotional well-being of another.
When the state attempts to terminate parental rights be-
cause of past abuse, the federal constitutional burden of proof is
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit.170 The
standard is high because the intact family is of great value and
importance in society. Thus, the assurance of accuracy is neces-
sary for all parties-state, parents, and child.' 71
Moreover, not just the parent and child lose the family con-
nection in a termination proceeding. If parental rights are termi-
nated, children often no longer see any of their blood relatives,
and the legal system views them as not having these relations.172
Aunts are no longer aunts, grandparents are no longer grand-
parents, and siblings are no longer siblings, unless they are
adopted by the same people. 73 This doctrine, however, is only
statutory, and it may be possible to amend statutes to order
169 See Carroll v Superior Court, 124 Cal Rptr 2d 891 (Cal App 2002). In Carroll,
appointed counsel entered a motion to be relieved from representing a seven-member
sibling group because of a conflict of interest. Id. Counsel argued that California's newly
adopted sibling relationship standard would require her to advocate for adoption on be-
half of some of the siblings and against it for the others. Id at 894. The appellate court
ordered that the trial court grant counsel's request. Id at 898. The appellate court sug-
gested that separate counsel would have to be appointed for each of the children because
a court cannot appoint one attorney for multiple siblings when it is reasonably likely an
actual conflict may arise. Carroll, 124 Cal Rptr 2d at 898. See also American Bar Associa-
tion, Standard of Practice for Lawters Who Represent children in Abuse and Neglect Cases
(adopted Feb 5, 1996), available online at <http://www.abanet.org/child-
repstandwhole.pdf> (visited May 3, 2004) ("If a lawyer is appointed as a 'child attorney'
for siblings, there may also be a conflict which could require that the lawyer decline rep-
resentation or withdraw from representing all of the children.").
170 Santosky. 455 US at 765-66 (noting that society is not neutral in its balancing of
the risk of error in wrongful termination cases, and that society places more emphasis on
maintaining the biological family even when it is imperfect).
171 Id.
172 Patton, 48 U Miami L Rev at 789 (cited in note 20) (noting that some courts view
all biological relatives' rights as derivative of those of the natural parents; once the par-
ents' rights have been terminated, other relatives' legal interests are terminated as well).
173 Id at 789 & n 222 (noting that a court ordering adoption has no jurisdiction to also
grant visitation rights to natural relatives).
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adoptive parents to permit visitation with blood relatives. At the
very least, if siblings are adopted together, they can maintain
arguably the most important kinship relationship.
At the permanency planning hearing, whatever the long-
term plan may be, as with intermediate placements, the sibling
group should remain together. If the state makes a recommenda-
tion to separate the sibling group, the court should hold another
hearing at which the state should have to prove that it would be
detrimental for the siblings to remain together, that all steps
were taken to keep them together, and that the state will assist
with frequent visitation between siblings. The burden of proof for
the hearing should be "clear and convincing," and legislation
should state that lack of resources is not an adequate defense. 174
Critics might raise doubts about this method of determining
placements because of a lack of state resources and the costs in-
volved with implementing this system. However, when children
are placed in the wrong environment and when they lose contact
with loved ones, they are more likely to grow up troubled and at-
risk.175 Children removed from their homes often need additional
help in school, extensive therapy or hospitalization, and are more
prone to become violent and commit delinquent and criminal acts
resulting in incarceration. 176 These problems result in increased
costs and burdens on the system, and may cost society more than
using the appropriate resources in the beginning. In the long
term, it is always more expensive to repair a system than it is to
build it correctly in the first place.
Under a clear and convincing burden of proof and a man-
dated preference for siblings to remain together absent extraor-
dinary circumstances, it is unlikely that the judge's decision to
remove Hugo from Ms. L and let his aunt adopt him would have
174 Consider HK v Taylor, 289 SE2d 673, 679 (W Va 1982) (suggesting that a lack of
resources is not a sufficient reason for failing to provide an appropriate placement in
status offender cases). In Taylor, the court stated that the juvenile courts and child wel-
fare department are not limited to their own resources but have the authority to cooper-
ate with private and state agencies to assure adequate placements for children under
their jurisdiction. Id.
175 See Rebecca L. Hegar, Sibling Relationships and Separations: Implications for
Child Placement, Social Service Review 446, 457 (Sept 1988) (discussing a study which
indicated that the primary reason for "depression, retardation and starvation" was the
separation of siblings).
176 See Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al, Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family
Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 Am J Psy-
chiatry 584, 585-87 (1988) (describing the fact that almost all of the studied juveniles on
death row had been "brutally, physically abused" as children).
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been upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The outcome
in Hugo resulted directly from an abuse of discretion standard
for appellate review, 177 and a lack of statutory mandates requir-
ing that siblings remain together.
In West Virginia, a statute provides that siblings are to be
put in the same placement unless it is shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence that residing in the same home will be harmful
to one or more of the siblings, that one child has a disability that
can be better cared for in the existing placement, or that sibling
reunification would not serve the best interests of one or more of
the siblings. 178
The advantages of such a rule are demonstrated by In re
Carol B.,179 a case similar to Hugo. Carol B. arose in West Vir-
ginia where the statute favors the preservation of sibling rela-
tionships. The state removed a younger sibling from the parental
home after a maternal aunt and uncle adopted two older sib-
lings. 80 The state originally placed the younger sibling with a
paternal aunt and uncle who wanted to adopt her, and who ap-
peared to be providing appropriate care for her, but who did not
encourage visitation among the siblings.' 8 ' Several months prior
to termination of the parents' rights, the state moved the
younger child in order to place her with her siblings. 82
The trial judge decided that the paternal aunt and uncle,
with whom the child was originally placed, should adopt the girl
because the siblings had not enjoyed adequate time to build a
bond, and because the child would excel in a household where
she was the only child and could receive more attention.183 The
maternal aunt and uncle appealed, and the appellate court re-
versed the trial court's decision. 84 The court held that both sets
of adoptive parents were more than capable of being good par-
ents to the girl, but "the law prefers, in the absence of compelling
circumstances, that siblings enjoy the many advantages of grow-
177 Hugo, 700 NE2d at 521-22 (holding that in a case where expert testimony and
heavy factual scrutiny is central to a determination of a child's best interests, the task of
the appellate court is not to review the trial court decision de novo, but rather to deter-
mine "whether the trial judge abused his discretion or committed a clear error of law').
178 W Va Code Ann § 49-2-14(e).
179 550 SE2d 636 (W Va 2001).
180 Id at 639.
181 Id at 640.
182 Id at 639.
183 In re Carol B, 550 SE2d at 640-41.
184 Id at 639.
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ing up together and the attendant opportunities to forge mean-
ingful, life-long relationships."18 5 This preference is the result of
a state statute with a high burden of proof and standards man-
dating that siblings stay together. Without such statutory pref-
erences, the state has the power to parcel out children as prizes
to placate various relatives with scant regard to the children's
needs-as the trial judge unsuccessfully attempted to do in Carol
B, and as the trial court in Hugo P succeeded in doing.
CONCLUSION
Children are not responsible for the harm that leads the
state to remove them from their parents' care and custody, al-
though many abused children view it in that light.8 6 The loss of
parents is a psychologically devastating event. The tearing apart
of other family relationships can enhance this trauma. Therefore,
termination of sibling relationships should be treated as seri-
ously as the termination of parental rights. "[F]ew consequences
of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family
ties."'8 7
The triangle of state, parent, and child that is usually in-
voked in family matters is too simplistic. It fails to reflect that
the child has family connections, such as siblings, beyond the
parent-child relationship. The state has to acknowledge and fos-
ter these other kinship ties that provide security and support in
times of trauma. Keeping siblings together dulls the pain of
abuse and the loss of parents, and prevents more extensive emo-
tional damage. Even if promoting sibling ties seems more compli-
cated and difficult to achieve, in the long run it is actually easier
and more humane for the state to try to keep brothers and sisters
together. If keeping siblings together is more likely to diminish
emotional damage to neglected and abused children, which in
turn decreases the need for special services, the state may actu-
ally come out as a winner too.
185 Id at 646.
186 Beth Bjerregaard and Anita Neuberger Blowers, Chartering a New Frontier for
Self-Defense Claims: The Applicability of The Battered Person Syndrome as a Defense for
Parricide Offenders, 33 U Louisville J Faro L 843, 869 & n 153 (1995) (noting that abused
children often "perceive their family situation as normal and therefore feel that interven-
tion is not necessary," and that such children "often blame themselves, feeling that their
parents' use of violence is legitimate and socially acceptable").
187 Santosky, 455 US at 787 (Rehnquist dissenting).
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